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Abstract
This paper develops theory and laboratory experiments to analyze
"price stickiness." We study the sequential equilibria of a game that
takes place over a sequence of "market periods." There are two risk
neutral traders, a buyer and a seller, with differential information.
The seller's cost of producing a unit of a fictitious good is known
and constant in all market periods. The buyer's value for the good
is a random variable governed by a Markov Process that is common
knowledge. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is de-
termined by "nature" and privately revealed only to the buyer. The
market is organized as a Posted Offer Institution: the seller posts
one price offer each period, and the buyer either accepts or rejects it.
The market termination rule is a binary random variable. We show
that for some parametric specifications, the model generates sticky
prices. However, because of differential information price stickiness is
an equilibrium phenomenon. We report results from fourteen labora-
tory experiments designed to compare the decisions of human subjects
with those predicted by the theory.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon known as "price stickiness' 1 is an important and often dis-
cussed issue in macroeconomics. In most economic sub-fields, researchers
presume that the price of a good or service adjusts to equilibrate supply and
demand. However, some economists argue that this assumption is inappro-
priate for macroeconomic analyses because some wages and prices appear to
adjust slowly. Further, there is an implicit presumption that price stickiness,
though the phenomenon itself is often never defined precisely, is bad. Stan-
dard examples of price stickiness given in this literature are that some labor
contracts are set for up to three years while some firms leave their product
prices unchanged for long periods. Although there are numerous theories
that purport to explain price stickiness. Blinder (1991, p. 89) reports:
Most economists would, I think, agree that we know next to nothing
about which of several dozen theories of wage-price stickiness are valid
and which are not. We might have expected statistical tests to have
weeded out the weaker theories by now, especially since many have
been around for a long time. ... I think the main reason is that most
of the theories are empty in the following specific sense: Either they
involve unobservable variables in an essential way. or they carry no real
implications other than that prices are "sluggish" in some unmeasurable
sense, or both. This makes econometric modeling a blunt
—
perhaps
even useless—investigative tool.
The purpose of this paper is to address two issues raised by Blinders
comments: First, virtually any pricing behavior (including prices that are
inflexible downward and those that are "flat" for long periods of time) can
be justified as "optimal" for some specification of agents' beliefs. However,
in naturally occurring markets agents' beliefs about future events are often
difficult to ascertain with any reasonable degree of confidence because the
underlying probability distributions that the beliefs are based on are not
well specified (i.e., are unobservable). One goal of this paper is to specif} - an
environment where both agents' beliefs and the pricing behavior implied by
theory can be specified and tested. Second, we wish to define price sticki-
ness precisely in the context of our controlled environment, and evaluate the
traditional presumption that stickiness is "bad."
The paper proceeds as follows. We study price stickiness in a market
game designed to resemble a retail institution. A single buyer of a ficti-
tious good experiences privately observed shocks to his/her valuation of the
good. In contrast, the seller knows only the stochastic process that governs
the good's value to the buyer. A sequential trading environment is formally
specified in Section 2, and is designed to focus on the following questions
regarding price stickiness: 1 How long do price adjustments by sellers lag
behind "learnable" shocks to demand? And more fundamentally: How do
agents form beliefs and pricing/buying strategies in well specified stochastic
environments? In Section 3 we formulate the buyer's and the seller's prob-
lems as stochastic discounted dynamic programming problems, and derive
stationary Markov strategies and equilibria of the market game. Section 4
contains a discussion of rational Bayesian equilibrium belief formation and a
notion of equilibrium price stickiness. Section 5 describes the experimental
implementation of the theory and Section 6 reports the results from fourteen
laboratory experiments. Finally. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a market with two risk neutral traders: a buyer and a seller. Trade
between the agents takes place over a sequence of periods, and the market
is organized as a Posted Offer Institution. 2 In each period, the seller may
produce one unit of an indivisible good. The seller's production cost is fixed
'Our model departs from two main concerns of much of the existing price stickiness lit-
erature: the frequency of price changes by sellers and selection criteria for games with mul-
tiple Pareto rankable equilibria. However, we maintain the imperfectly competitive market
structure common in these models. See Gordon (1991) for a survey of this literature.
2See Ketcham, Smith and Williams [1984] for a complete description of this institution.
and common knowledge. In contrast, the buyer has a reservation value for
the good which follows a Markov Process that is common knowledge. The
unit's value to the buyer, i\ can take on one of two possible values, h or
/, denoting high and low respectively. The Markov Process describes the
period-to-period dependence (serial correlation) in the unit's value over the
sequence of market periods, and has the following features: Given the unit's
value in the previous period, the probability that the unit's value is the same
in the current period is 1 — a, and the probability that it changes (i.e.. either
from high to low or from low to high, given the previous state) is a. The
unit's value to the buyer in the first period (i.e., the initial state) is a random
variable, drawn from a known uniform distribution.
We restrict attention to the case of positive serial correlation. That is,
we assume that < a < 1/2. Of course, three other cases are possible:
When q = 0, the initial draw determines the unit's value for all periods.
When q = 1/2, the unit's values are completely uncorrelated.
When 1/2 < a < 1. the unit's values exhibit negative serial correlation.
We ignore (i) and (ii) because they eliminate price cycles (the phenomena
that motivate our study), and (iii) because it does not correspond to most
naturally occurring Markov Processes of economic interest (e.g., weather pat-
terns, oil shocks, and monetary shocks all exhibit positive serial correlation).
Each period trade occurs according to the following sequence of events.
At the beginning of the period the unit's value is determined by "nature"
(the value of the first unit is drawn randomly from a (known) distribution
and the value of each subsequent unit is determined by the stationary Markov
Process described above). We assume that the complete description of the
Process is common knowledge of both agents, but that the unit's current
value is privately revealed only to the buyer. The seller then posts a single
price offer. The buyer can either accept or reject the seller's price offer. If the
buyer accepts, the unit is traded at the price posted by the seller. The buyer
makes a profit on the unit equal to the difference between the unit 's ( random)
value for the period and the posted price. The seller makes a profit on the
unit equal to the difference between the posted price and the (known) cost.
If the buyer rejects the offer the unit is not produced and is not traded, and
both traders make zero profit. This concludes the current market period. 3
Whether or not trade occurs in the next period is determined by the
following probabilistic termination rule: The probability that the market
ends each period is given by 8. a number between and 1. For risk neu-
tral traders, this is equivalent to assuming a discount factor of 8. Strictly
speaking, the termination rule for the market is the binary random vari-
able {Continue. Stop}. In the next Section we will state the seller's and
the buyer's problems as discounted dynamic programming problems, and
< 8 < 1 is required for these problems to be well defined. Fortunately,
8 is a parameter that can be specified by the experimenter via the publicly
announced termination rule. The trading and termination procedures are
repeated for each subsequent period until the market ends.
3 Strategies and Equilibria
We focus on equilibria in stationary Markov strategies for the model described
in Section 2. Given the distribution of the buyer's value for the initial unit,
and a history of past price offers by the seller and answers by the buyer, the
seller forms a belief (for any equilibrium of the game) about the buyer's value
for the current unit of the good. In each period the seller considers only this
belief about the current unit's value to the buyer, and the buyer considers
only his/her own (known) value and the seller's belief about the value. Agents
do not consider the history of game (i.e., the sequence of previous price offers
and answers) except for the previous price and answer information reflected
3There is no "price discounting" in this market—the seller posts a single price and does
not revise it. See Davis and Holt [1990] for an analysis of the Posted Offer Institution
with discounting but without value or cost shocks.
in the seller's current belief. To derive equilibrium strategies, we assume that
the seller's initial belief is common knowledge.'4
A stationary strategy for the seller is a map from the seller's belief to the
space of price offers. We express the seller's belief by a number w £ [0, 1],
where w denotes the seller's subjective probability that the buyer's value for
the current unit of the good is high. A stationary strategy for the buyer is a
map from the unit's value for that period, the seller's belief, and the seller's
price offer to a binary decision variable which indicates the buyer's answer.
The Appendix shows that equilibria in stationary strategies of this game have
the following simple state dependent form: An equilibrium is characterized
by a triple (w m , p/, /?/,), which indicates the critical belief of the seller, the low
price offer and the high price offer, respectively. Equilibrium strategies for
each agent are a pair (p(w), A(w,p, u)), where
( Ph if w > w"; or
{ Pi otherwise;
and
f Y if either: p < />/: or: p < ph and v = //;A(w,p,v) =
*- I\ otherwise.
Thus, equilibrium strategies are a state dependent price offer by the seller
denoted by {P3 ). and a state dependent answer by the buyer denoted by (P/,),
where Y denotes "yes" and N denotes "no." The seller's and the buyer's dy-
namic programming problems that these state dependent stationary strate-
gies are solutions to are specified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
The equilibria of this game, given by the triple {w",pi,ph), are sequential
equilibria (see Kreps and Wilson [1982]). We have specified p{w) above. To
complete our analysis of the equilibria we must provide a rule that the seller
follows in order to form beliefs, both on and off the equilibrium path. We
assume that on the equilibrium path, the seller follows Bayes rule. Recall
4 In the experiment, this assumption is guaranteed by the fact that the first unit's value
is drawn randomly from a known distribution.
that w denotes the seller's belief that the buyer's value for the current unit
is high. Let w'(-) denote the seller's belief that the buyer's value for next
period's unit is high. From Bayes rule, it follows that
«/(•) = w{\ -a) + (1 - w)a.
This equation indicates that the value for next period's unit may be high for
two reasons: the current unit's value was high and did not change (the first
term) or it was low but changed states (the second term).
The stationary strategy of each agent is binary, thus there are four pos-
sible belief situations:
(i) w'(ph, Y, w) = 1 — a: If the seller posts the high price and the buyer
accepts, then the seller believes that the unit's value is the same as in the
current period (i.e.. is high),
(ii) w'(ph, A, w) — q: If the seller posts the high price and the buyer rejects,
then the seller believes that the unit's value has changed (i.e., is low),
(iii) w'(pi, V, w) = w(l — 2a) + a = w: If the seller posts the low price and the
buyer accepts, then the seller revises his/her belief regarding the unit's
value according to the formula given by w.
(iv) w'(pi, X. w) — a: We assume that if the seller posts the low price and the
buyer rejects, then the seller believes that the unit's value has changed.
Beliefs (i). (ii), and (iii) are equilibrium path strategies that follow directly
from w' = w(l — a) + (1 — w)cc. In particular, when the buyer accepts the
seller's high price offer, this is a perfect signal that v = h: thus w = 1 and
w' is given by (i). When the buyer rejects the seller's high price offer, this
is a perfect signal (in equilibrium) that v = /: thus w = and w' is given
by (ii). When the buyer accepts the seller's low price offer, this action is
not perfectly revealing; thus w' is given by (iii). Finally, (iv) is an "ofF the
equilibrium path"' strategy, so we must attribute to the agent some belief
in order to complete the belief specification rule. We assume that when the
buyer rejects the seller's low price offer the seller believes that v — I so w = 0.
This is a plausible assumption because when v — I the buyer loses nothing
by rejecting the seller's equilibrium low price offer. However, if u — h the
buyer foregoes substantial profit by rejecting the seller's low price offer.
3.1 The Seller's Problem
A stationary strategy for the seller is a map p: [0, 1] —-> IB+ . That is, a
stationary strategy is a map from the set of beliefs to the space of price
offers. We assume that the seller knows his/her own beliefs, w, and his/her
own value function defined over [0. 1] and denoted by Va (-). Denote by 1{a=Y]
the indicator function of the set {A = ) }. which is a random event from the
seller's perspective. Let c denote the seller's (known) cost of producing each
unit that is sold. The seller's functional equation can be written:
V3 (w) = maxEw {pl{A=Y } + 6Va {w'(p, A, w))}.
3.2 The Buyer's Problem
Recall that a stationary strategy for the buyer is a function from beliefs,
the price offer, and the unit's current value into the answer set .4 E {V, N}.
We assume that the buyer knows the realization of the unit's current value,
v — h.l. takes the seller's price and beliefs as given, and knows his/her own
value function defined over [0,1] x }R+ x {h.l} and denoted by U(-)- The
buyer's functional equation can be written:
r fv-p + 6Vb(iv'(p,Y,w),p'(w'{p,Y,w)),v') \(A = )-Vh[iL\ p.v) = max t v <
Ae{Y,\} { 6Vb (w'{p, N, w),p'{w'(p, A', w)), v') if .4 = N
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the
stochastic process for the unit's value to the buyer, conditional on v being
the current value. "Primes" denote next period's magnitude for the variable.
'The seller's cost plays no role in our analysis so we normalize c = 0.
4 Discussion of the Solution
In the sequential market game that we consider, the seller moves first by
posting a price, but has imperfect information (both ex ante and ex post)
about the value of a sequence of units to the buyer. The seller knows his/her
own cost, the probability structure that generates the buyer's sequence of
values, and forms a belief about the unit's value in any given period. More
specifically, the seller knows: the unit's value is either high or low. the Markov
Process that governs the evolution of the unit's value, and the previous an-
swers of the buyer. However, the seller does not observe directly the actual
realization of the unit in any market period. The buyer moves second and
responds to the seller's price offer—after the state of nature has been re-
vealed. The buyer knows the seller's price offer and cost (and consequently
the seller's profit), as well as the unit's current value.
When < a < 1/2 and the seller is rational (i.e.. uses all available
information and Bayes rule), equilibrium strategy (Ps ) indicates that the
seller behaves as if he/she forms a critical belief, denoted by w" , about the
unit's value to the buyer. Recall that w denotes the probability that v — h.
The seller's state contingent pricing strategy indicates that the seller should
post a high price (p/J if w > tr", and a low price (/;/) otherwise. The seller
uses this strategy both to maximize revenue and to acquire information.
Equilibrium strategy (Pb ) indicates that the buyer should accept the seller's
price offer, regardless of whether it is high or low. if the value is high: but
should accept only the seller's low price offer if the value is low. Thus the
buyer rejects high price offers only when the value is low, and otherwise
accepts any price that does not exceed /. In the Appendix we prove that
strategies (Ps ) and (P/,) are indeed solutions to the seller's problem and the
buyer's problem, respectively, in Lemma A.l and Lemma A. 2.
It is interesting to note that the buyer's equilibrium strategy sometimes
reveals information to the seller, and when it does the information is revealed
truthfully. At first dance this mav seem odd. One may wonder why it is not
optimal for the buyer to reject the seller's high price offer when the value
is high in an attempt to mislead the seller and drive down the price. This
strategy is not optimal in the market that we consider because lying is costly
so the buyer's equilibrium strategy (P/,) involves an essential tradeoff. If the
buyer accepts price offer p^ this action reveals information to the seller, but
the buyer gets an immediate reward for telling the truth (i.e., the profit from
the trade). On the other hand if the buyer lies (by rejecting ph when in
fact v = h) this action distorts the seller's belief, but the cost of lying is
the profit foregone on the rejected current trade. Thus, the buyer faces a
tradeoff between current profit and manipulating the seller's beliefs (in the
hope of obtaining higher future profit)— in a sequential game with a random
termination rule and an oscillating value sequence. The seller's equilibrium
strategy (Ps ) takes this tradeoff into account as w" (the seller's critical belief)
depends on 8 (the termination rule) and on / and h (the oscillating values).
In the remainder of this Section, we discuss the nature of equilibrium price
paths, provide an estimate of w" in terms of 8. h and /. and discuss "price
stickiness" in our model and in naturally occurring markets.
4.1 Equilibrium Price Paths
An equilibrium in stationary strategies is identified with the triple ( w~ . p/, ph )
If such a triple describes all equilibria, then /)/ = / by the following argument:
pi < I because if v — I then any higher price offer by the seller would be
rejected by the buyer, and the buyer would have no incentive to deviate from
this answer strategy. Clearly, pi — I is a dominant strategy in equilibrium.
The high price offer is bounded by / < ph < h.
A key determinant of the equilibrium price path is the relationship be-
tween the critical belief w* and 1/2, where 1/2 is the invariant measure of
the Markov Process (which describes the evolution of each unit's value over
10
the course of the game). Note that 1/2 is also the limit belief of the seller
when no new information about the unit's value to the buyer is acquired. In
fact, lim, x w
l
= 1/2 for every w. Thus there are two possible cases:
(1) w* > 1/2: In this case the belief region [0, w~] prevails and is invariant.
The equilibrium price offer by the seller is p/, which gives the seller no
new information about the unit's value. Hence if w G [0, w"] at some
points, then all subsequent beliefs remain in this interval and converge to
the limit belief 1/2. The unit's value to the buyer is equal to / in finite
time with probability one, and in the following period the seller's belief
is in [0, w'] for any previous belief. Thus, in this case prices attain the
constant level pi in finite time with probability one.
(2) w" < 1/2: In this case, equilibrium prices follow a cyclical pattern for any
realization of the buyer's value process. Consider beliefs w < w". The
seller's equilibrium price ofTer is p/, and the sequence of future beliefs is
given by w' , until the first time iq that w'° > w m (where Iq is finite)—
then the seller's price offer becomes p^. If the unit's value is low. then
the buyer refuses the seller's offer, the seller sets his/her new belief to a,
and the process described above begins again. If the unit's value is high,
then the buyer accepts the seller's offer, and the seller sets his/her new
belief to 1 — q and maintains a price offer of Ph (and a belief of 1 — o)
until the unit's value becomes low. Finally, when the unit's value does
in fact become low, the buyer rejects the offer, and a new period of low-
price offers begins. The average length of the periods in which the seller
makes low price offers is constant and given by:'
L = min{u ,! > a 1 "}.
6 Let w l denote the ith iterate of the equilibrium Bayesian belief formation rule w' —
w{\ — q) + (1 — u)o. Iteration shows that belief u>' converges to 1/2 for every iv when
< q < 1/2.
'The function ()' is defined in the Appendix.
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4.2 The Seller's Critical Belief
We now provide an estimate of the magnitude of the seller's critical belief, w".
An exact computation is difficult because w" depends on the computation of
the equilibria. However, in the Lemma below we provide an estimate of w"
in terms of the known parameters h, /, and 6. This estimate is essential for
experimental analysis of the theory. Recall that w is a probability, thus we
wish to obtain non-t rival left and right bounds on w" between and 1. We
begin by introducing the following notation:
7 = EL- ~ - ' 7 = Mi-M anfi _ = Ki- f)
T
~ ph'
~ t ~ m-sy *i - pa-pi+pj(i-*)' ~' ~ h-i+w-sy
Clearly we have: z\ < Z\ < z r (l — S) < Z r , since p t = / and p h < h in
equilibrium. Also at w = 1 we must have, in equilibrium, ph > h{\ — 6). or
the seller would deviate and post any price below h that he/she expects the
buyer to accept with probability one. Therefore, Z r < zT .
The following Lemma provides an estimate of the seller's critical belief.
Lemma. z\ < w" < z r .
Remark. To simplify the analysis, normalize pi = I = 1. Observe that
^ h > jZd' t'ien w
m
< 1/2 so the equilibrium outcomes have persistent
cycles of the nature described previously. Alternatively, if h < 2 — 6, then it
follows from the inequality in the Lemma that w" > 1/2 and the equilibrium
outcomes converge to the low price offer with probability one. These results
are essential for the experimental analysis of our theory, and are consistent
with the following intuition: When the seller believes that the unit's value is
high, v — h, and consequently believes that the buyer has a large consumer
surplus (that the seller wishes to exploit), the seller posts a high price to
increase revenue and to acquire information about the unit's value. In the
experimental analysis of the model in Section 6 we choose h to be sufficiently
Unlike the low price, pi = I, the equilibrium high price, p/,, need not be unique (i.e.,
the distribution of exchange surplus is indeterminate).
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high (i.e., $2.50 or $2.20) in some experiments, given / = Si and 8 = 0.05, to
ensure that the seller has an incentive to acquire information. In equilibrium
the high price is fully revealing, so when h is high enough theory predicts the
seller pursues the cyclical pricing strategy even at the cost of some occasional
lost trades. In other experiments we choose h to be low enough (i.e., Si. 50) to
ensure that it is not optimal for the seller to attempt to extract information
from the buyer, so theory predicts prices attain the constant level p\.
Proof. When 8 = 0, the seller is indifferent between posting the low or
high price if w = Pi/ph- However, when 8 > price offer /?/> gives the seller
additional information about the unit's value. Thus, for 8 > 0. w" < Z r .
If w satisfies9
Pl + 8Vs (w) - 8Vs (a) - w[ph + 8(Vs (l - a) - V(a))] = M > 0.
then w < w\ But M > ^-[/;,(1 - 8) - w(ph - Sp,)]; so if
PhJ;^_, } >
w, then w < w' . We have shown that w' > —pl , ""'",
,
—rr = Z;, and this
concludes the proof.
4.3 Price Stickiness
The market game described in this Section has several interesting features
that may provide insight into "price stickiness" phenomena in actual markets.
First, observe that three different pricing patterns can be optimal, depending
on the seller's beliefs:
(i) p(w) = pi\ If the seller posts only low price offers, it is always optimal for
the buyer to accept such offers (regardless of the value realization). This
"always post a low price" strategy is optimal for the seller if the seller
believes the probability that the buyer's value is high (w) is weakly below
the critical value iw").
9This equation describes the situation where the value to the seller of posting the low
price is strictly greater than the expected value of posting the high price.
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(ii) p(w) = Ph'- If the seller posts only high price offers, it is optimal for
the buyer to accept such offers if the value is high. If the value is low,
the buyer rejects the offer. This "'always post a high price" strategy is
optimal for the seller if the seller believes the probability that the buyer's
value is high (iu) is always above the critical value (w m ).
(iii) p(w) = [pi,Ph)'- Pi'ice cycles (i.e.. oscillations between the high price and
the low price) are optimal when the seller's beliefs oscillate about w" and
the length of the cycle is given by L in Section 4.1.
The precise nature of the optimal pricing pattern depends on the seller's
beliefs, which in turn depend on the Markov Process and the buyer's de-
cisions. The crucial feature of the solution is that in general, virtually any
seller pricing strategy is optimal given some seller belief specification. Agents'
beliefs about probability structures are often difficult to elicit in naturally
occurring markets because actual probability structures are often unobserv-
able. Fortunately, probability structures such as the Markov Process in this
paper can be easily controlled in laboratory markets. Our experimental de-
sign (specified in the next Section) makes essential use of this feature of the
market game.
The second interesting feature of this market game is that "price sticki-
ness" can be defined precisely: We define price stickiness as a situation where
the seller's price is not responsive to a change in the buyer's demand (i.e..
a value transition). The model predicts periods of "unchanged" prices, and
the length of these periods of "flat prices" (on average) is endogenously de-
termined by L. However, in contrast with the traditional presumption that
price stickiness is "bad," the non-instantaneous adjustment of prices in our
model is an equilibrium phenomenon; it results from the seller's attempt to
learn the Markov Process. Consequently, the full information prices. />/ = /
and ph = h (where the seller captures all of the exchange surplus), provide
a benchmark for measuring the welfare loss associated with price stickiness
14
(or more precisely—differential information). 10
In conclusion, the differential information price stickiness model that we
propose has the following features. First, differential information reduces
market efficiency relative to full information when h > r—7 because agents
systematically forego trade on units for which the seller posts p^ (to acquire
information about the unit's current value) but the value is low. Second, the
buyer prefers the differential information solution (/?/ = / and / < p^ < h) to
the full information solution because in general it allows the buyer to obtain
some exchange surplus. Finally, when information is revealed in the differ-
ential information equilibrium it is revealed truthfully—but the equilibrium
is not fully revealing. 11 The fact that the equilibrium strategy is incentive
compatible but not fully revealing provides insight into the following criticism
often levied against models with differential information. 12 If differential in-
formation causes an economy to achieve Pareto inferior allocations (relative
to the full information case), why don't agents willingly reveal their private
information to the market and thereby attain the Pareto superior full in-
formation allocations? In our environment the answer is clear. Although a
social planner is indifferent to the distribution of exchange surplus, individ-
ual agents are not. By not announcing the true value, the buyer captures
some exchange surplus when the seller posts the low price and his/her value
is high (i.e., case (iii) of the Bayesian belief formation rule in Section 3). In
contrast, in the full information case the seller fully extracts all available ex-
change surplus. We discuss the robustness of this result in the final section,
and turn now to an experimental analysis of the model.
10This is the full information monopoly solution. Multiple bilateral monopoly solutions
are inapplicable because of the sequential nature of the game: the seller moves first and
posts a "take-it" or "leave-it" price. Further, "two-part pricing" and other intertemporal
surplus extraction schemes are inapplicable due to the absence of commitment mechanisms.
11 Recall case (iii) and the definition of u in Section 3.
12 For example, this criticism is sometimes made of the Lucas [1972] "Islands Model."
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5 Experimental Design
The trading rules of the Posted Offer Institution are reported in Ketcham,
Smith, and Williams [1984]. This experimental market is of interest because
it resembles naturally occurring retail institutions. 13 We consider a market
with a single seller and a single buyer that is conducted over a sequence of
"trading periods." There is a single unit of a fictitious good each period. The
Posted Offer trading rules specify a "two-step" decision procedure: First, the
seller privately makes a price decision and posts a "take-it or leave-it" offer.
Second, the buyer either accepts or rejects the offer. We assign costs and
values for the single unit of the good each period in accordance with the
procedures described in Smith [1976]. The seller's cost of producing each
unit is known and equal to zero (i.e., c = 0). The buyer's value for each unit
(v) is either 1 or /?. 14 The actual value in any period is determined randomly:
(i) The initial value is drawn from a known equal distribution, so the prob-
ability that the first unit's value to the buyer is high (i.e., h) is 1/2 and
the probability that it is low (i.e.. 1) is 1/2.
(ii) All subsequent values are determined by a (first order) Markov Process
with the following characteristics: P(c = l|u = 1) = P(u = h\r = h) =
1 - a = 0.9. and P(v = h\v = 1) = P{v = l\v = h) = a = 0.1, where
P{-\-) denotes a conditional probability.
The explanation of (i) is obvious. From (ii) it follows that the probability
that the current value is the same as last period's value is 90 percent and
the probability that it has changed is 10 percent. In general, when a is small
there is persistence in the process so there is a big payoff over time to the
seller from trying to extract information about the unit's true value. The
invariant measure of the distribution is 1/2.
13See Plott [1982] and [1989] for surveys of experimental economics.
14 Based on the computations in the Remark in Section 4.2, price cycles will occur
whenever h > $2.10, given that / = $1 and 6 = 0.05.
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The value determination rule was publicly announced, and was induced
in the experiment by the following procedure: The experimenter rolled a
20-sided die at the beginning of each market period.
- In period 1, if the outcome was an 11 through 20 the value of the first
unit was high; otherwise it was low.
- In periods 2 end, if the outcome was a 1 through IS. the value of the
current unit was the same as last period's value; otherwise it changed.
Several examples of stochastic processes were shown to subjects in the
Instructions. Further, subjects were told that the invariant measure of the
process was 1/2. Specifically, they were told that any long sequence of values
generated by the value determination rule would have the following charac-
teristics:
(1) On average about half of the values would be high and half would be low.
if the experiment lasted for many market periods.
(2) There would be period-to-period dependence in the unit's value over the
course of the experiment.
Both the seller and the buyer knew the seller's cost (i.e., c — 0), and both
knew the value determination rule. However, the current value of the unit was
privately revealed only to the buyer at the beginning of the period, but was
never revealed directly to the seller at any time during the experiment. The
fact that agents' had differential information ex post was public knowledge.
Finally, the termination rule used in all experiments was stochastic. Sub-
jects were undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Illinois.
They were told that the experiment would last between twenty minutes and
three hours, and that the final market period was uncertain and would be
determined by the following stopping rule: The experimenter would roll a
20-sided die at the end of every market period. If the outcome was a 1 the ex-
periment would end; otherwise it would continue for the next market period.
This termination procedure corresponds to a discount factor of S = 0.05.
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6 Experimental Results
We report the results of the following series of experiments that correspond
to the theory in Section 4 and the design in Section 5:
(i) six experiments with inexperienced sellers and simulated buyers where
h > 7-^j: equilibrium prices predicted by theory have persistent cycles:
(ii) three experiments with experienced sellers and real buyers where h > y^:
equilibrium prices predicted by theory again have persistent cycles; and
(iii) two experiments with inexperienced sellers and simulated buyers where
h < 2 — 8: equilibrium prices predicted by theory converge to p/.
The first series of experiments was designed to investigate the seller's ac-
tual pricing strategy when the buyer always followed the stationary Markov
equilibrium strategy (Pj). The second series of experiments was designed to
introduce strategic uncertainty into the agents' problems. That is. in the first
series of experiments the seller was told that the buyer would make decisions
according to decision-rule (A): accept the seller's price offer (regardless of
whether it is high or low) if the value is high, but accept only the seller's
low price offer if the value is low. In the second series of experiments both
the buyer and the seller had no information about eachother's decision-rule
other than the information contained in the instructions and their obser-
vations about eachother's decisions as the game progressed. Thus agents
faced strategic uncertainty in addition to differential information about the
stochastic process. The third series of experiments was designed as a "check"
on the consistency of the model. Finally, in all series (i) through (iii) experi-
ments we elicited the seller's belief about the unit's value in the next period.
They were not paid for reporting their beliefs thus the data we report for w'
are only suggestive.
We also report the results of a series of pilot experiments:
(iv) three experiments with inexperienced sellers and real buyers where h >
Y^: equilibrium prices predicted by theory have persistent cycles.
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The pilot experiments correspond to the theory in Section 4 but deviate from
the experimental design in Section 5 in the following important way: Sub-
jects were told that there was a 5 percent chance that the experiment would
terminate each period to induce S = 0.05. However, they were also told that
when one market experiment ended they would rotate roles and a new mar-
ket experiment might begin, depending on time constraints. Unfortunately
this role rotation procedure undermines the effect of the random termination
rule, thus this series of experiments does not constitute an accurate test of
the theory. We report the results for completeness.
6.1 Inexperienced Sellers-Simulated Buyers: Cycles
We report the results from the first series of experiments in Figures 1 through
6. Figures la through 6a report the results of contract prices and rejections
when h > t=-t. where h = S2.50 in Figure la and h = $2.20 in the remainder.
1 — °
The theory in Section 4 predicts persistent cycling and all of our results
are consistent with this prediction. In Figures la. 2a. 3a. and 5a the true
value of the first unit was low. The seller offered a high price for unit 1.
the buyer rejected the offer, and the seller immediately offered the low price
for the next trade. 15 In Figures 4a and 6a the true value of the fust unit
was high. The seller offered a high price for unit 1, the buyer accepted the
offer, and the seller maintained the high price offer until it was rejected.
There was variance among the sellers in Z., the length of periods in which
the seller made low price offers. The theoretical prediction is 6 periods when
h = $2.50 and 9 periods when h = $2.20. 16 The observed period length of
the first cycle of low price offers reported in Figure la, where h = $2.50,
15 All sellers offered a low price that was "behaviorally consistent" with the theoretical
equilibrium prediction of pi = 1 because in experimental markets subjects often require a
commisssion of $0.05 to $0.10 to induce them to trade zero profit units.
16 Use the definition of L from Section 4.1 to compute these predictions where w' follows
from the Bayesian updating rule in Section 3 and w' follows from c; in Section 4.1.
19
is 2. The length of the first cycle of low price offers in Figures 2a through
6a, where h = 82.20. is 3, 5, 5, 4 and 3 respectively. In general, the data
reported in Figures la through 6a correspond to the theoretical equilibrium
price level predictions, the length of the low price cycles are shorter than
the theoretical L prediction, and the length of the high cycles is consistent
with the theoretical prediction. Sellers' earnings were §59.23, S36.40, $16.89,
$49.40, S39. 40. and $43.00 respectively.
Figures lb through 6b report sellers' (unpaid) beliefs that the unit's value
in the next period will be high: w' — w(\ — a) + (1 — w)a. The equilibrium
predictions in the Figures are derived from the four belief situations delin-
eated in Section 3. The seller's critical belief is w* — .388 in Figure lb and
w* = .442 in Figures 2b through 6b, where w" is marked by an asterisk on
each of the figures. 1. Figures 2b, 3b, 4b. and 6b are somewhat consistent
with the Bayesian updating predicted to occur when w'(pi,Y,w) = w (i.e.,
case (iii)). while Figures lb and 5b are not consistent with the theoretical
predictions for case (iii) beliefs. The reports are generally consistent with
the theoretical beliefs in cases (i), (ii), and (iv).
6.2 Experienced Sellers-Real Buyers: Cycles
We report the results of the second series of experiments in Figures 7 through
9 when h > r^-?, where /? = $2.20 in Experiments 7 and 8 and /? = $2.50 in
Experiment 9. Theory again predicts persistent cycling, and all subjects in
this series of experiments had participated in a series (i) experiment. Their
experience profiles are as follows: In Experiment 7 the seller had participated
in Experiment 1 and the buyer was in Experiment 5. In Experiment S the
seller was in Experiment 2 and the buyer was in Experiment 4. In Experiment
9 the seller was in Experiment 3 and the buyer was in Experiment 6.
Experiment 7 lasted for 13 periods and the price data are reported in
''This follows from the computation of z\ in Section 4.2.
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Figure 7a. There was one value transition: the first 7 units were low and the
remainder were high. The seller posted the low price for the first unit and the
buyer accepted, an equilibrium answer. The seller posted high prices for two
of the next three units, a deviation from equilibrium strategy (Ps ). and was
rejected, an equilibrium answer. The seller posted the equilibrium low price
thereafter (for S periods), consistent with the equilibrium L prediction of !).
The seller's profit was $10 and the buyer's profit was $7.20. Interestingly, the
buyer always followed equilibrium strategy (A), even when he/she received
zero profit on a trade. Figure 7b indicates that the seller's (unpaid) belief
reports were not consistent with the theoretical w' predictions.
Experiment S lasted for 63 periods and the price data are reported in
Figure Sa. The buyer frequently deviated from equilibrium strategy (Pi,).
and this appears to have severely impaired the seller's ability to learn the
Markov Process. The buyer's behavior may be explained by two factors.
First, subjects in market experiments often require a commission of $0.05 to
SO. 10 to induce them to trade zero profit units. 18 Thus, the "behaviorally
acceptable" equilibrium low price may have been SO. 90. Inspection of the
data reveals that the buyer accepted only S trades and rejected 55. The
lowest price the seller offered was SO. 90 on two occasions, and the buyer
accepted this price both times. The buyer accepted SO. 99 on five occasions
when the unit's value was high and once (in the last period) when it was
low. Second, the buyer's opportunity cost of deviating from equilibrium
strategy (A) was small. The seller's profit was $7.7-1 and the buyer's profit
was S6.26. Had the buyer followed (A) the seller would have earned S65.06
in additional profit but the buyer would have earned only SO. 95 in additional
profit. 19 Figure Sb indicates that the seller's (unpaid) belief reports were not
lsNo commissions were paid in any of these experiments because one prediction of the
theory is that equilibrium strategy (Pj) is incentive compatible. The absence of commis-
sions provide a strong test of this prediction.
19The asymmetry in foregone profits stems from the seller's aggressive pricing strategy
(i.e., SO. 99 and $2.10) and the buyer's unusually large number of low values (49/63).
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consistent with the theoretical w' predictions.
Experiment 9 lasted for 41 periods and the price data are reported in
Figure 9a. The seller's low price eventually settled at SO. 75, mid-way be-
tween the theoretical equilibrium price of Si and the "'equal profit split"1 low
price of SO. 50. The seller's high price appeared to settle at Si. 25, the "equal
profit split" price when the unit's value is high. The length of the seller's low
price offer ranged between 3 and 11 periods, but was 6 periods on average
(excluding the final sequence of low prices), consistent with the theoretical
L prediction when h = S2.50. The buyer deviated from equilibrium strategy
(Pi,) in periods 3. S, 9, 10, and 15, but his/her behavior was otherwise con-
sistent with the theory. The seller's profit was $24.75, the buyer's profit was
$24.25, and the values were equally split between high and low outcomes.
The seller's (unpaid) belief reports were generally not consistent with the
theoretical predictions for w'
.
6.3 Inexperienced Sellers-Simulated Buyers: pi = 1
We report the results of the third series of experiments in Figures 10 and
11, where h = Si. 50 in both experiments. Theory predicts that prices will
converge to pi with probability one, and /)/ = 1. Experiment 10 lasted for
24 periods and Experiment 11 lasted for 39 periods. The data reporter! in
Figures 10a and 11a are generally consistent with the theoretical prediction.
Figure 10a indicates that the seller posted a high price (p^ = Si .01 ) in periods
11 and 19. a deviation from {Ps ), but all other decisions correspond to it.
The price decisions in Figure 11a correspond exactly to the pricing behavior
predicted by theory. The sellers' profits were S24.51 in Experiment 10 and
S45.50 in Experiment 11. Figures 10b and lib report the seller's actual and
equilibrium beliefs, where w* = .655. 20 Figure 10b indicates that the seller's
(unpaid) belief reports are consistent with the theoretical predictions in the
20This follows from the computation of r; in Section 4.2.
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first ten periods, but do not display the gradual convergence toward 1/2 in
the second half of the experiment predicted by theory. However, belief region
[0,itf*] prevails and is invariant after the seller's high price offer is rejected in
period 9 as predicted by theory. Figure lib indicates a similar pattern.
6.4 Inexperiened Sellers-Real Buyers: Pilots
We report price data for three pilot experiments in Figures 12, 13, and 14.
where h = $2,50. We did not elicit beliefs from sellers in these experiments,
and the termination procedure used in this series of experiments effectively
undermined the random termination rule (8) necessary for the theoretical p.
1/;*, and L predictions. Subjects were told that when one experiment ended
they would rotate roles and a new market experiment might begin, but they
were given no explicit information about the number of rotations. Although
S was not well specified, we report benchmark predictions for 6 = .05.
The data reported in Figure 12 display the persistent cycles and the state
dependent pricing predicted by theory. The experiment lasted for 150 market
periods with 4 role rotations. The first 'phase'1 lasted for 92 periods, and the
true value of the first unit was low. The seller posted declining high prices
for the first six units and was rejected on all trades. The seller then posted a
low price for two periods that was accepted, but again posted the high price
for the next four periods and was rejected. The seller posted a low price
for the next twelve periods and was rejected in five of the twelve periods.
The subjects often deviated from equilibrium strategies (Ps ) and (A), and
the data suggest that they may have been engaged in an implicit bargaining
process. Eventually they tacitly agreed on the "equal profit split" low price
of $0.50 and the "equal profit split" high price of Si. 25. Thus, subjects
conformed to the two-state cyclical pricing rule, but the level of pi was below
the theoretical equilibrium prediction, and the actual length of low prices
was somewhat lower than the L = 6 predicted by theory. The number of
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non-equilibrium buyer rejections was dramatically lower in the second half
of the experiment.
The data reported in Figure 13 are also generally consistent with the pre-
dictions of the theory by the second half of the experiment. The experiment
lasted for 75 periods with 3 role rotations. Subjects again tacitly agreed on
a low price, in this case of $0.90. which is behaviorally consistent with the
theory, and a high price in the range Sl.25-Sl.75. The data suggest that the
subjects again may have engaged in a bargaining process.
Finally, the data reported in Figure 14 are strikingly inconsistent with
the predictions of the theory when / = $1, h = $2.50. and S = 0.05. The
experiment lasted for 94 periods with 4 role rotations. The seller and the
buyer tacitly agreed to post and always accept a single price offer of SO. 95.
However, the theoretical analysis in Section 4 indicates that the cyclical na-
ture of the optimal contract price path depends on both the Markov Process
and the fact that the experiment may terminate (with probability 0.05) after
each market period. Because we indicated to subjects that even if the exper-
iment ended they might switch roles and participate in a new experiment, it
appears that they (quite rationally) ignored the random termination rule. If
the market is certain to last for many periods, it is optimal for subjects to
agree on a single price because the invariant measure of the Markov Process
is 1/2 (over many market periods about half of the values will be high and
half will be low, so the expected exchange surplus each period is Si. 75). A
fixed price of SO. 95 gives the seller a certain profit of SO. 95 each period and
the buyer an average profit of SO. SO each period.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops theory and laboratory experiments designed to study
"price stickiness." Our theory indicates that observed prices that appear to
be sticky may in fact be generated by rational equilibrium learning about an
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underlying stochastic process. Although contract prices are ''set" for long
periods of time, price stickiness is distinct from the persistence in the under-
lying process. Equilibrium price stickiness occurs when the seller occasionally
and intentionally foregoes trade in order to learn the Markov Process that
governs the unit's value. The data from laboratory experiments are gener-
ally consistent with the predictions of the theory. Unlike previous studies,
the theory and experiments provide a framework in which potential sluggish-
ness in price adjustment can be measured precisely. We find little evidence
that contract prices are inflexible downward, a result that is consistent with
findings by Carlton (19S6) for various naturally occurring markets. 21
Our model can be easily extended to the case of a single seller and multiple
buyers, where buyers are randomly chosen to "shop" 1 each period. We have
also developed theory and experiments to study the stationary equilibria of
the Posted Bid Institution where a single seller with a two-state cost that
follows a Markov Process and multiple (five) buyers with known values for a
single unit of a fictitious good trade. The equilibrium strategies for this game
predict similar episodes of equilibrium price stickiness, but the Posted Bid
Institution does not have a clear analog in naturally occurring markets. The
introduction of multiple sellers in the Posted Offer Institution is an interesting
but difficult problem in this setting that remains for future research. Finally.
the unpaid belief data elicited in these experiments suggest that this may be
a fruitful environment for studying expectation formation. See Keane and
Runkle ( 1990) for an excellent discussion of the difficulty of testing rationality
in naturally occurring markets.
-'In series (i) and (iii) experiments where the seller knew the simulated buyer was
following strategy (Pt), prices were never inflexible downward or sluggish: The seller took
rejection of p^ as a perfect signal of a value transition. In series (ii) experiments, "sluggish
adjustment" was observed once in Experiment 7 (in period 3); seven times in Experiment
8 (in periods 54 through 60) after persistent deviation by the buyer from (A): and eight
times in Experiment 9 in periods 2, 4. 9, 10, 20, 33, 36, and 37.
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8 Appendix
The function (•): [0, 1] -> [0. 1] is defined by w = (1 - 2a)iu + a. Let (•)'. for
i = 1,2 denote its /th iterate. Let the function ( : ): [a, 1 — a] —* [0. I]
denote the inverse of
(
: ), i.e., w = (w — a)(l — 2a) -1 , and let ( : )\ for i —
1.2 denote its ?th iterate.
We consider first the problem of the seller. The seller faces a buyer with
a policy (Pt,) given by
A(w,p.v) =
[
Y if either p < pi\ or: p < ph and u = h.
N otherwise.
The optimal policy of the seller (P3 ) is determined by the solution to the
Seller's Dynamic Programming Problem, specified in Section 3.1. Recall
that Ps is given by the function:
\ Ph. if w > w'l
p(v) =
.
^ pi it w < w .
Lemma A.l. For a given answer policy of the buyer, the value function of
the seller exists, is continuous, and gives a policy of the form P3 .
Proof. We can write the functional equation which defines the value of
the seller as:
V3 (w) = max{p/ 4- 8V3 {w);{\ - w)6Va [a) + w\ph + 6\ s {\ - a)}}
The right hand side of this equation defines a map from continuous functions,
uniformly bounded above by ph(\ — S)' 1 and below by zero, into the same
space. Therefore a unique fixed point exists. We now prove that the policy
has the stated form.
For simplicity, denote two functions / and g by:
f(w) = pi + 8Vs {w); and g(w) = (1 - w)6Vs {a) + wp h + w6Vs (l -a).
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Note that Vs (w) — max{/(tr), g(w)}, and that /, g are continuous. Since
/(0) > g{0), /(l) < g{l), there exists a non-empty set of iu's such that
f{w) = g{w)- We now prove that this set is a singleton. By a standard
argument, Va is concave and so is /. while g is linear. Hence, the set of
intersection points is a closed interval, in the interior of (0.1) because of
the inequalities at the boundary. Let w' denote the right extreme of this
interval, i.e., w" = maxjtr: /(tr) > g{w)}. Let .4 = 8Vs (a), D = pk +
S[Vs (l — q) — 1'5 (q)]; now for any w E (max(.0, w"), w"), one can easily find
f'(w) = 6(1 — 2a)B < B = g'{z). Hence the interval is the singleton {»'"}.
Lemma A. 2. For a given price policy of the seller, the value function of the
buyer exists, is continuous from the right, and gives a policy of the form P^.
Proof. For the (fixed) value w' in the buyer's policy, let w
t
= w" , for
i — 0,1,2 Note that there is only a finite number of non-negative u\
values. Then define the function space 5*:
5* = {\\: [0, 1] x {ph<Pi} x {h, /}: Vb(w, •, ) is continuous for every w E [0.1]:
V(-;p;v) is right continuous and continuous on [iy,-_ j , vl\ ) for ever}' i. and
every p. r}.
With the topology induced by the supremum norm, this is a complete met-
ric space. Consider now the functional equation defining the buyer's value
function (see Section 3.2). The right hand side defines all operations from
S^j into 5*. For instance, when p = pi, v — h. the corresponding equation is:
(h- Pl + 6[(l - a)Vb(w,p(w),h) + aVb (iu,p{w),l)};
Vh{ w, Ph., h) = max < ,
[S{(\ -q)V 6 (1 -a.p(l -a)Ji) + a\l(l -a./>(l -a)./)]}
The other three cases define three similar equations. A standard application
of the Contraction Mapping Theorem to space 5^ gives a unique fixed point.
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